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Schad v. Arizona: Diminishing the Need for Verdict Specificity
Most Americans take for granted that a criminal defendant will not
be convicted unless the jury renders a unanimous verdict. In state crimi-
nal proceedings, however, the United States Constitution provides no
such guarantee.' Instead, the states may decide by statute whether to
afford the protection of a unanimous verdict. Although many states do,
they often neglect to specify exactly what the jurors must agree upon in
order to reach unanimity.2 In Schad v. Arizona3 the United States
Supreme Court addressed this issue-almost.
Under Arizona law both premeditated murder and murder during
the course of a felony constitute first-degree murder.4 In Schad the State
prosecuted Edward Schad for first-degree murder, but rather than alleg-
ing either premeditated murder or felony murder, it charged Schad with
both.5 Because the State allowed the jury to return a general guilty ver-
dict, the defendant claimed that his conviction was not necessarily unani-
mous as guaranteed: the jury was not required to specify the theory on
which it convicted Schad and, therefore, some jurors might have believed
the defendant was guilty of premeditated murder while some might have
believed he was guilty of felony murder.6 The Supreme Court looked at
the problem differently, focusing instead on the limits of a state's power
to define crime-that is, whether the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion prohibits a state from equating premeditated murder and felony
murder.7 A plurality of the Court concluded that felony murder and
premeditated murder may be considered alternate means of establishing
the crime of first-degree murder, and thus the jury need not agree on only
one alternative. 8
This Note recounts the plurality's opinion and examines the varied
1. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (affirming the constitutionality of a
nonunanimous verdict in a state criminal trial).
2. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 24.
3. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
4. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105.A (1989); see infra note 74 and accompanying text
for the language of the statute.
5. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 2495-96 (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
8. Id. at 2504 (plurality opinion). The plurality also held that where a jury is instructed
on first-degree (premeditated and felony) murder and on second-degree murder, the Constitu-
tion does not require that it also be instructed on lesser-included offenses of felony murder. Id.
at 2505 (plurality opinion).
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case law upon which the plurality relied.9 It then analyzes the way in
which the plurality refrained the jury unanimity issue as one of defini-
tional limitations,1" and the implications of this reframing." The Note
further assesses the plurality's reliance on precedent and analogy,12 its
assumption that premeditation and the commission of a felony are means
of satisfying a mens rea element of first-degree murder,13 and its due pro-
cess-fundamental fairness inquiry. 4 The Note concludes that the plural-
ity's recharacterization of the jury unanimity issue is misguided.
Moreover, even within the terms of definitional limitations, the plural-
ity's reliance on precedent and analogy is unpersuasive, and its due pro-
cess analysis is superficial and uninformative because the plurality failed
to offer anything more than a survey of current and historical practice.
On August 1, 1978, seventy-four year old Lorimer Grove left his
home in Bisbee, Arizona, driving a Cadillac and towing a camper. 5 Two
days later an abandoned rental car containing some of Grove's belong-
ings was found off U.S. Highway 89 in Arizona. 6 Edward Schad had
rented the car the previous December but never returned it.17 On Au-
gust 9 Grove's body was found strangled to death in the underbrush by
Highway 89, but the body was not identified until October 11.18 In late
September Schad was arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah, for parole viola-
tion and possession of a stolen automobile." The stolen automobile-
Grove's Cadillac-also contained some of Grove's personal belongings.
In addition, Schad had two of Grove's credit cards in his wallet.2" Later,
while in jail, Schad made a number of incriminating statement's about
Grove's death to one of his friends.2
After Grove's body was identified, a grand jury in Yavapai County,
Arizona, indicted Schad on one count of first-degree murder, and he was
extradicted from Utah to stand trial.22 Schad was prosecuted and con-
9. See infra notes 75-139 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
15. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
16. Id. (plurality opinion).
17. Id. (plurality opinion).
18. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 413, 788 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1989), aff'dsub. nom. Schad
v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
19. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. (plurality opinion).
21. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 413, 788 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Schad
v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
22. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
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victed of first-degree murder on premeditated murder and felony murder
theories, and sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court over-
turned his conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on
the definitions of the alleged underlying felonies.23 On retrial Schad was
again prosecuted under theories of premeditated murder and felony mur-
der.24 The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder and, after a sen-
tencing hearing, sentenced him to death.25 The Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and rejected Schad's contention that the jury was
required to agree specifically on a single theory of first-degree murder.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 7 and affirmed
the conviction.28 The plurality framed the issue as whether it was per-
missible under the Due Process Clause for Arizona to define both pre-
meditated murder and felony murder as first-degree murder.29 If it was,
then the defendant received the unanimous verdict guaranteed him by
Arizona law. Four Justices concluded that it was permissible,30 one Jus-
tice concurred in this result but argued that the due process analysis was
unnecessary," and four Justices dissented. 2 Justice Souter wrote for the
plurality.33
23. Id. (plurality opinion); see State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 621, 691 P.2d 710, 712
(1984). According to the Arizona Supreme Court, the prosecution described to the jury what
robbery was, but the trial judge failed to give an explicit instruction as to its elements:
[Ihe jury was informed that it could convict Schad of the first-degree murder if it
found the murder was committed during a felony, yet inexplicably, no underlying
felony was defined. Fundamental error is present when a trial judge fails to instruct
on matters vital to a proper consideration of the evidence. Knowledge of the ele-
ments of the underlying felonies was vital for the jurors to properly consider a felony
murder theory. This was absent.
Id. at 620-21, 691 P.2d at 711-12 (citation omitted).
24. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion).
25. Id. (plurality opinion).
26. Id. at 2495-96 (plurality opinion); State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 417, 788 P.2d 1162,
1168 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
27. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 243 (1990).
28. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505.
29. Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 2494 (plurality opinion). The four Justices in the plurality were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
31. Id. at 2505-07 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra
note 56 (discussing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
32. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2507-12 (White, J., dissenting). The four dissenting Justices were
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
33. The plurality also considered whether it was necessary, under Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980), to give an instruction on a lesser-included offense of felony murder when there
was already an instruction on second-degree murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504 (plurality
opinion). By a five-to-four vote the Court concluded that it was not. Id. at 2494 (plurality
opinion). Justice Souter wrote for the majority.
In Beck, the defendant was sentenced to death following his conviction for robbery-inten-
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Justice Souter began the plurality's analysis by stating that jury una-
nimity was not really at issue.34 In support of this proposition, he sug-
gested an analogy. In criminal indictments, the State is not required to
"specify which overt act, among several named, was the means by which
a crime was committed."35 This flexibility has been extended beyond the
indictment stage to the verdict level itself, in which "'there is no general
requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual is-
sues which underlie the verdict.' "36 The rule was developed to provide
tional killing. Beck, 447 U.S. at 627-30. Alabama law prohibited conviction for lesser-in-
cluded offenses in capital cases; therefore, the trial judge was forbidden to instruct on felony
murder as a lesser-included offense of robbery-intentional killing. Id. at 628. As a result, the
jury was faced with an all-or-nothing choice: to convict the defendant of robbery-intentional
killing, which carried with it the death sentence, or to acquit. Id. at 627-29. According to the
Beck Court, the absence of a third option, which the lesser-included charge would have pro-
vided, deprived the defendant of his due process protections by enhancing the risk of an un-
warranted conviction. Id. at 637. The Court held that in a capital case where the exclusion of
a lesser-included offense instruction increases the level of uncertainty in the jury's decision, a
statute barring such an instruction violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 638.
The majority explained that the Schad facts were clearly distinguishable from Beck be-
cause Beck prohibited limiting the jury instruction to an all-or-nothing choice between first-
degree murder and acquittal, while the Schad jury was instructed on a third option of second-
degree murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504-05 (plurality opinion). Thus, the petitioner could
succeed in his argument only if Beck's due process standard mandated an instruction on every
lesser-included offense of a capital crime and if robbery was in fact a lesser-included offense in
Arizona. Id. at 2504 (plurality opinion).
While it might appear self-evident that the charged underlying felony is a lesser-included
offense of the felony murder charge, such is not the case in Arizona, where "there is no lesser-
included offense to felony murder." State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 417, 788 P.2d 1162, 1168
(1989), aff'd sub nom. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). Thus, the Arizona Supreme
Court believed that the evidence against Schad supported a robbery conviction, id., but held
that the Beck requirement of instruction on a lesser-included offense of felony murder was not
implicated because Arizona recognized no such lesser-included offenses. Id.
According to the Schad plurality, it would be highly irrational to assume that a jury,
convinced Schad had committed some crime but not first-degree murder, would nonetheless
convict him of first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at
2505 (plurality opinion). Therefore, the Court was satisfied with the reliability of the jury's
verdict. Id. (plurality opinion). Because the Beck analysis did not lead to the conclusion that
a jury in a capital case necessarily had to be instructed on every lesser-included noncapital
offense, the Schad plurality did not consider whether in this instance robbery was such a lesser-
included offense. Id. (plurality opinion).
34. Schad, II1 S. Ct. at 2496 (plurality opinion). Schad argued that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment combined to require jury unanimity in state capital cases. Id. (plurality
opinion). The Court declined to address directly this issue, however, because the jury was
unanimous in its conclusion that the defendant was guilty. Id. (plurality opinion). But see
infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (suggesting that jury unanimity actually was in
question).
35. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2496 (plurality opinion) (citing Andersen v. United States, 170
U.S. 481, 504 (1898)).
36. Id. at 2497 (plurality opinion) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227,
1236-37 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted)).
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flexibility with regard to the actus reus elements of a crime; in Schad the
Court was confronted with the somewhat different problem of "alterna-
tive mental states." 37 Nevertheless, the plurality could "see no reason
... why the rule that the jury need not agree as to mere means of satisfy-
ing the actus reus element of an offense should not apply equally to alter-
native means of satisfying the element of mens rea."38 The real question,
then, was whether due process prohibited Arizona from equating the
commission of a felony with premeditation as a means of establishing the
mens rea of first-degree murder. 9 If it did not, then the rule that there
need not be jury agreement as to the means of establishing the essential
elements of a crime would compel the conclusion that a jury could val-
idly convict the defendant without specifically agreeing on whether first-
degree murder was established by premeditation or by the commission of
a felony. Before answering this question, however, the plurality argued
that a detailed exercise, in statutory construction was necessary to
demonstrate that Arizona defined premeditation and the commission of a
felony as means to amens rea element of first-degree murder rather than
as essential elements."
According to the plurality, the Court does not have the authority to
substitute its construction of a state statute for that of the state's courts. 41
Because the Arizona courts had found it permissible to return a general
guilty verdict on a first-degree murder charge, they had "effectively" de-
termined that premeditation and commission of a felony are means to
satisfying a mens rea element, rather than independent elements of the
crime.42 The plurality's acceptance of the state court's conclusion is con-
37. Id. (plurality opinion).
38. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Souter warned that this conclusion was not a recogni-
tion of the State's unlimited power to define criminal conduct through any combination of
mental states or overt acts. Id. (plurality opinion). He also suggested an analogy to the
Court's "vagueness" cases: just as the Due Process Clause prohibits overly broad or incompre-
hensibly vague definitions of crime-which are subject to wide ranging interpretations by indi-
viduals of common intelligence, id. (plurality opinion) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939))-it likewise prohibits irrational groupings of unrelated acts or mental states
under the general rubric of "crime." Id. at 2497-98 (plurality opinion).
39. Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 2499-500 (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 2499 (plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 2499-500 (plurality opinion). This notion apparently derives from the fact that
Arizona's courts have labelled the commission of a felony the "legal equivalent" of premedita-
tion. See id. at 2497 (plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 188, 211 P.2d
455, 459 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 973 (1950)). Nevertheless, it is not clear that legal
equivalence eliminates the need to prove independently either premeditation or the underlying
felony, and thereby makes both evidentiary burdens merely a way to satisfy the mens rea
element of first-degree murder. For example, under Arizona's first-degree murder statute, ar-
son and kidnapping are legally equivalent in that they can both supply the requisite mens rea
940 [Vol. 70
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sistent with the general rule that decisions as to whether facts are mate-
rial, and thus must be proved individually as essential elements, or
immaterial, serving only as the means of satisfying an essential element,
are decisions most appropriately made by the State, not the Supreme
Court.4 3  Nevertheless, a point exists beyond which the state cannot,
consistent with the Due Process Clause, relieve itself of the burden of
proving certain facts.4" Finding that point, the plurality noted, requires
that the state action be measured against the due process requirement of
fundamental fairness, as evidenced both by historical and current prac-
tice, and by a sense of equivalent culpability.45
In the plurality's opinion, equating premeditation with the commis-
sion of a felony as mental states of comparable culpability "finds substan-
tial historical and contemporary echoes."' 46 The shift from the common-
law definition of murder as a crime committed with malice aforethought
to the modem statutory equivalent of premeditation has carried along
with it the inclusion of the commission of a felony as one possible means
of establishing the requisite mental state.47 In fact, numerous states
have, over a substantial period of time, held that there need be no jury
agreement as to which of these means supplied the necessary mental
state.48 Arizona's equating of the two means was not outside the norm of
current or historical practice, and was presumptively likely to meet the
for a first-degree murder conviction. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105.A.2 (1989). But
clearly the State could not establish arson-murder by proving to the jury that a kidnapping and
a murder had been committed. See also infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (arguing
that premeditation and the commission of a felony are distinct, essential elements which can-
not be established in the alternative).
43. Schad, I11 S. Ct. at 2499-500 (plurality opinion). The plurality contended that defer-
ence for such state decisions is evident in the Court's approach to burden-shifting cases. Id. at
2500-01 (plurality opinion) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
The Court confronted a similar argument in both the burden-shifting cases and in Schad:
each petitioner attempted to show that the State had the burden of proving some fact-a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the burden-shifting cases, the means to the requisite
mens rea in Schad-which was not properly an essential element of the charged crime. Id.
(plurality opinion). In both situations the Court had to decide, "as an abstract matter, what
elements an offense must comprise." Id. at 2501 (plurality opinion). It concluded that the
problem commanded judicial restraint and respect for legislative decisionmaking, rather than
the adoption of a bright-line test. Id. (plurality opinion).
44. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).
45. Id. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 2501 (plurality opinion)
47. Id. at 2501-02 (plurality opinion) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTt,
JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 210-11 (1986); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 21-22 (London, MacMillan 1883)).
48. Id. at 2502 (plurality opinion). As evidence of widespread support of this notion,
Justice Souter cited cases from several jurisdictions. See infra note 77 and cases cited therein.
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criterion of fundamental fairness.4 9 Despite these strong indications of
compliance with due process, however, Justice Souter admitted that Ari-
zona's practice was still "open to critical examination.""0
Although the plurality was unwilling to establish a bright-line test
for determining whether alternative means of satisfying a mens rea ele-
ment are materially different, it did concede that the alternative mental
states had to "reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness
or culpability."51 The specific question, then, was whether robbery-mur-
der and premeditated murder could be considered equivalently culpa-
ble. 2 The plurality turned to Tison v. Arizona, 3 wherein the Court had
found the death penalty permissible for felony murderers who played a
major role in the underlying felony but who did not actually commit or
intend the killing. 4 Relying on Tison, the plurality declared that "it is
clear that such equivalence could reasonably be found, which is enough
to rule out the argument that.., moral disparity bars treating [premedi-
tation and the commission of a felony] as alternative means to satisfying
the mental element of a single offense." 5 The plurality allowed that
greater jury specificity probably is a sound idea, but held "only that the
Constitution did not command such a practice on the facts of this
case."
56
49. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2502 (plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 2502-03 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 2503 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. (plurality opinion).
53. 481 U.S. 137 (1987); see infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
54. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
55. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503-04 (plurality opinion).
56. Id. at 2504 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, who represented the fifth vote in favor
of affirmance, disagreed with the plurality's rationale despite his belief that the plurality cor-
rectly identified the issue as whether "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the subdivision of [first-degree murder] into (at least) premeditated murder and felony
murder." Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scala concluded that the plurality reached the correct answer, but was off the mark in its
analysis. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In fact, he argued
that
[s]ubmitting killing in the course of a robbery and premeditated killing to the jury
under a single charge is not some novel composite that can be subjected to the indig-
nity of "fundamental fairness" review. It was the norm when this country was
founded, was the norm when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, and
remains the norm today.
Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Under Justice
Scalia's conception of the problem, when judges subject historically well-grounded procedures
to a fundamental fairness test, it is the judges themselves who are open to attack. Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The plurality's analysis failed, in Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion, because it provided no substantive basis for a fundamental fairness test,
other than equivalent blameworthiness. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
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Justice White, joined by three other Justices, wrote a dissenting
opinion which expressed sharp disagreement with the plurality's framing
of the issue, its analysis, and its conclusion. 7 In Justice White's opinion,
the plurality mischaracterized the constitutional issue by focusing on
whether premeditated murder and felony murder were permissibly alter-
native ways of establishing first-degree murder.58 Instead, the plurality
should have addressed the due process requirement, set out in In re Win-
ship, 9 that every fact necessary to convict a criminal defendant must be
the judgment). In Justice Scalia's view, equivalent blameworthiness might be necessary but it
could not be sufficient Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). There-
fore, Justice Scalia argued, the plurality could do nothing more than fall back repeatedly on
historical justification. Id. (Scalia, L, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia based his analysis on the assumption that the plurality had asked the right
question: whether the Due Process Clause prohibits Arizona from labeling both felony murder
and premeditated murder as first-degree murder. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). A more appropriate question, however, might well be whether
the Due Process Clause prohibits Arizona from allowing the jury to return a general guilty
verdict on first-degree murder when both premeditated murder and felony murder have been
charged. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
Even under Justice Scalia's conception of the question, it is not clear that his analysis is
correct. By way of illustration, Justice Scalia suggested that
[w]hen a woman's charred body has been found in a burned house, and there is
ample evidence that the defendant set out to kill her, it would be absurd to set him
free because six jurors believe he strangled her to death (and caused the fire acciden-
tally in his hasty escape), while six others believe he left her unconscious and set the
fire to kill her.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). True
as this observation might be, it adds very little to an understanding of the problem Schad raises
because it focuses on the actus reus of the crime rather than the mens rea. A more profitable
illustration might be the following: X is run down and killed by a car driven by Y. Six jurors
believe Y purposefully and premeditatedly ran down X with the intention of killing her. Six
jurors believe that Y committed a robbery and was in the course of flight from that robbery
when he accidentally ran down X. (The six jurors who believe Y intentionally killed X do not
believe he committed the robbery.) Despite the fact that premeditation and the commission of
a robbery may be "legally equivalent," it is quite clear that a first-degree murder conviction
based on the divided verdict suggested above should not stand. If Y did not commit the rob-
bery (which, as a matter of law, he did not, because only six jurors were convinced that the
elements of robbery were proven), then in order to convict, first-degree murder by premedi-
tated intentional killing should have been proven to all twelve jurors-but it was not. If Y did
not act with premeditated intent (which again, as a matter of law, he did not), then in order to
convict, first-degree murder in the course of a felony should have been proven to all twelve
jurors-but it was not. This differs from the illustration Justice Scalia offered because that
illustration suggested alternative causes. In order to convict a defendant of first-degree murder
it must be proven that the defendant caused the death, not that he caused it by strangulation or
by fire. If six jurors in Justice Scalia's example believe the victim died by strangulation, and six
believe she died in the fire but that the defendant did not set the fire, there could be no convic-
tion. Only if all twelve jurors agree on cause is the verdict valid.
57. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2507-08 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2508-09 (White, J., dissenting).
59. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' ° The true issue, Justice White ar-
gued, was whether it is permissible for a jury to convict a defendant of
one crime on alternative theories "possessing no [essential] elements in
common except the fact of a murder."61 Conviction on these alternativee
theories, the dissent concluded, would condone an impermissible mixing
and matching of essential elements.62 Under the holding of Schad, a de-
fendant can be convicted of first-degree murder by a jury in which six
jurors are convinced that the elements of felony murder have been
proved, and six are convinced that the elements of premeditated murder
have been proved.63 "A defendant charged with first-degree murder is at
least entitled to a verdict," Justice White admonished, which was "some-
thing petitioner did not get in this case as long as the possibility exists
that no more than six jurors voted for any one element of first-degree
murder, except the fact of a killing.""
Justice White dismissed the plurality's reliance on analogous case
law.65 Moreover, he maintained that the differing penalties for felony
murder and premeditated murder mandated jury specificity.66 Only in
limited situations can the death penalty be imposed for felony murder;
the death penalty was imposed in Schad, however, because the sentenc-
ing judge was convinced that the defendant was guilty of premeditated
murder.67 According to the dissent, "[i]t is clear, therefore, that the gen-
60. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508 (White, L., dissenting) (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
61. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White set out the essential elements of each type of
murder: under Arizona law felony murder requires that the "defendant had the requisite in-
tent to commit and did commit the underlying felony" but does "not require that the defend-
ant commit the killing or even intend to kill, so long as the defendant [was] involved in the
underlying felony." Id. at 2508-09 (White, L., dissenting). Premeditated murder, on the other
hand, requires "an intent to kill as well as premeditation" and the actual commission of a
killing. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2509-10 (White, 3., dissenting). According to Justice White, the vagueness cases
provide an inappropriate analogy because the Arizona first-degree murder statute was in fact
very specific, but the jury was allowed to return a general verdict and was not required to
indicate on which of the alternate theories it convicted the defendant. Id. at 2509 (White, J.,
dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 155-57. The dissent also dismissed the analogy
to cases that held that the jury need not agree on the means of establishing the elements of a
crime because, according to the dissent, the means were not at issue in Schad; the elements
were. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510 (White, J., dissenting); see infra note 154. Finally, Justice
White argued that the plurality's burden-shifting analogy was misguided because Arizona had
appropriately established the elements of first-degree murder by statute, but its courts were
now inappropriately reading those elements out of the statute. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510-11
(White, J., dissenting); see infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
66. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2511 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing sentencing trial transcript).
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eral jury verdict creates an intolerable risk that a sentencing judge may
subsequently impose a death sentence based on findings that contradict
those made by a jury,""8 a risk which the Due Process Clause must be
understood to prohibit.69
In support of its conclusion that the jury need not agree on the
means of establishing the mens rea element of first-degree murder, the
Schad plurality relied on a wide range of authority. Some authority was
related directly either to the question of jury specificity7" or to the ques-
tion of the equivalent blameworthiness of premeditated murder and fel-
ony murder.71 Much of it, however, was analogously related to the
question of the constitutional limits on the states' power to define crimi-
nal conduct. Vagueness cases and burden-shifting cases, for example, fo-
cused on this question at one level or another. Understanding how these
analogies and the jury specificity and equivalent blameworthiness issues
affected the plurality's decision requires a careful examination of those
cases that both the plurality and the dissent discussed. It also requires an
examination of the Arizona laws the jury used to convict Schad.
Like most states, Arizona constitutionally guarantees a unanimous
verdict in criminal trials.7" Arizona also requires that the jury consist of
twelve jurors when the potential sentence is death or imprisonment for
68. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
69. Justice White also took issue with the plurality's application of the Beck standard to
Schad. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that the plurality considered Arizona's
actions to be in compliance with Beck because the jury instruction was not limited to an all-or-
nothing choice between first-degree murder and acquittal: second-degreee murder also was
charged. Id. at 2512 (White, J., dissenting). But this instruction failed to provide a realistic
third option, the dissent pointed out, because second-degree murder is not a lesser-included
offense of felony murder, and is not a charge on which the jury could legitimately convict if it
believed -the defendant had only committed the robbery and not the murder. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissent declared, a straightforward application of logic will reveal that
felony murder necessarily must embody a lesser-included felony offense. Id. (White, J., dis-
senting). By the explicit terms of the Arizona statute the defendant could not commit robbery-
murder without also having committed either robbery or attempted robbery. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, "as a matter of law," robbery or attempted robbery was a lesser-in-
cluded offense of robbery-murder even though Arizona did not recognize it as such, id. (White,
J., disssenting), and the Due Process Clause, as understood through Beck, required that it be
charged, 1d. at 2513 (White, J., dissenting). The instruction on second-degree murder as a
lesser-included offense of premeditated murder was simply insufficient, the dissent concluded,
where the State itself had chosen to proceed on alternate theories, each of which necessarily
contained lesser-included offenses. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
70. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
72. "In all criminal cases the unanimous consent of the jurors shall be necessary to render
a verdict." ARiz. CONsT. art. II, § 23.
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thirty years or more.7 3 The Arizona first-degree murder statute under
which Schad was convicted provides that
[a] murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in
wait, torture or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate or pre-
meditated killing, or which is committed in avoiding or
preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from legal cus-
tody, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson,
rape in the first degree, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or may-
hem, or sexual molestation of a child under the age of thirteen
years, is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murder
are of the second degree.7'
The Arizona courts frequently have read this statute, in its various
forms, to mean that the commission or attempted commission of one of
the enumerated felonies is the legal equivalent of the premeditation re-
quirement.75 Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on these prior
73. Id.
74. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978); see also id. § 13-
451A ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.") (repealed
1978). The language of the current Arizona homicide law differs slightly from that under
which Schad was convicted. At present, a person is guilty of first-degree murder if
"[i]ntending or knowing that his conduct will cause death, such person causes the death of
another with premeditation." Id. § 13-1105.A (1989). Felony murder continues to constitute
first-degree murder. Id. Arizona has ceased, however, using the term "malice aforethought."
Id. § 13-1101.
75. See, e.g., State v. McLoughlin, 139 Ariz. 481, 485-85, 679 P.2d 504, 508-09 (1984)
("ITihe mens rea necessary to satisfy the premeditation element of first degree murder is sup-
plied by the specific intent required for the felony."); State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493, 496, 647
P.2d 624, 627 (1982) ("[F]irst-degree murder is only one crime regardless [of] whether it oc-
curs as a premeditated murder or a felony murder ... [and therefore] the defendant is not
entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the act was committed." (cita-
tions omitted)); State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 188, 211 P.2d 455, 459 (1949) (The "felony ...
takes the place of and amounts to the legal equivalent of... deliberation, premeditation, and
design."), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 973 (1950).
Interestingly, the Arizona courts not only have construed the commission of a felony as
the legal equivalent of premeditation but also as the legal equivalent of malice aforethought
(which is the element that turns the killing of a human being into murder). "The specific
intent for the felony ... supplies the necessary element of malice or premeditation." State v.
Ferrari, 112 Ariz. 324, 328, 541 P.2d 921, 925 (1975) (en bane); see also State v. Collins, Ill
Ariz. 303, 306, 528 P.2d 829, 832 (1974) (holding that a felony murder conviction only re-
quires that the victim be killed during the felony, not that he be killed with malice afore-
thought). This has not always been the case: in Eytinge v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 131, 100 P. 443
(1909), the Arizona Supreme Court held that killing by poison was not necessarily first-degree
murder, because before murder could be proven, malice aforethought also had to be indepen-
dently proven. See id. at 140-41, 100 P. at 446. Presumably, the court's unwillingness to read
malice out of the murder statute not only applied to murder by poison or premeditated mur-
der, but also to felony murder. But now that Eytinge "has in effect been overruled," Ferrari,
112 Ariz. at 328, 541 P.2d at 925, malice aforethought is an unnecessary component of felony
murder:
"[]f a human being is killed by another person while such person is engaged in the
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rulings when it affirmed Schad's conviction over the argument that due
process mandates separate verdict forms for premeditated and felony
murder: "The defendant's arguments on this issue have all been previ-
ously decided by this Court and rejected." 76
According to the Schad plurality, these arguments also had been
rejected by a number of other state courts," with the leading case on this
issue being People v. Sullivan.71 In Sullivan the New York Court of Ap-
peals considered the same issue raised in Schad: namely, whether a de-
fendant prosecuted for first-degree murder on theories of premeditated
murder and felony murder was entitled to a verdict specifically limited to
one of the two theories.79 It concluded that the defendant was not enti-
tled to such a verdict. s0 Relying on the premise that an indictment need
not specify which of several theories the prosecution will proceed upon,
and on the notion that a defendant who uses multiple means to kill
should not escape conviction because of the jury's inability to agree on
which of the means actually caused the death, the court found the gen-
eral verdict permissible."' "[I]t was sufficient that each juror was con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the
crime of murder in the first degree as that offense is defined by the
statute."
'8 2
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery, such person doing the
killing under such circumstances is guilty of murder of the first degree, regardless of
whether the killing is intentional or unintentional."
State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277, 287, 350 P.2d 681, 687 (1960) (quoting jury instructions)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 609 (1961). But if the killing can be intentional or
unintentional, it makes no sense to presume that the felony supplies premeditation because it
would be meaningless to describe a killing as premeditated and unintentional. Thus the legal
equivalence of premeditation and the commission of a felony is dubious if the commission of a
felony also supplies malice aforethought; if it does not also supply malice aforethought, unin-
tentional killing in the course of a felony should not be murder in Arizona because it occurs
without the requisite malice.
76. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411,417, 788 P.2d 1162, 1168 (1989), aff'd sub nor. Schad
v. Arizona, 111 5. Ct. 2491 (1991).
77. See People v. Milan, 9 Cal. 3d 185, 194-95, 507 P.2d 956, 961-62, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68,
73-74 (1973); People v. Travis, 170 Ill. App. 3d 873, 890-92, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1147-48 (1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Iowa 1977);
State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 344-45, 552 P.2d 931, 935-36 (1976); Commonwealth v. Dev-
lin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-66, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-75 (1957); People v. Embree, 70 Mich. App.
382, 383, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 940-42, 468 N.W.2d 589,
591-93 (1991); James v. State, 637 P.2d 862, 865-66 (Okla. 1981); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 562-68 (Utah 1987).
78. 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989 (1903).
79. Id. at 127, 65 N.E. at 989.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 128-29, 65 N.E. at 990.
82. Id. at 127, 65 N.E. at 990. The dissenting judge, of course, viewed the case quite
differently:
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More that eighty-five years after Sullivan, the Oregon Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion in State v. Boots.83 In Oregon
"aggravated murder"-which carries with it a possible death sentence-
is defined as a murder committed with any one of several enumerated
aggravating factors.84 Boots was charged with murder either in the
course of a robbery or for the purpose of concealing the identity of rob-
bers, both of which constitute aggravated murder.8 5 The jury returned a
general guilty verdict, but the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the
conviction. 6 The court examined decisions from a number of other
states but found them unpersuasive8 7 More importantly, the court re-
jected the general jury verdict on the principle that "the instruction re-
lieves the jury from seriously confronting the question whether they
agree that any factual requirement of aggravated murder has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, so long as each juror is willing to pick one
theory or another.""8 Such a disjointed jury would not comprise a unani-
I am unable to appreciate the force of the reasoning in support of this proposition. If
it be correct it must follow that the chances of a conviction are very much improved
by the introduction of various theories in support of a single charge. If, for instance,
it were possible for the prosecutor to try the case upon a dozen theories and a single
juror could be induced to assent to each theory, the whole body could unite in a
verdict of guilty although no one theory could command the assent of more than a
single juror.
Id. at 145, 65 N.E. at 996 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
83. 308 Or. 371, 780 P.2d 725 (1989) (en banc). While neither the Schad plurality nor the
dissent referred directly to Boots, the plurality did point to State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782
P.2d 157 (1989), as evidence of the fact that the Sullivan rationale had not been unanimously
adopted. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2502 (plurality opinion). But in Murray the Oregon Supreme
Court relied on Boots for its holding. Murray, 308 Or. at 497, 782 P.2d at 157.
Like Oregon, the State of Washington also has rejected the Schad rationale. In State v.
Golladay, 78 Wash. 2d 121, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), the defendant was charged with first-degree
murder committed either with premeditation or in the course of a felony. Id. at 122, 470 P.2d
at 193. The Washington Supreme Court first declared that the two "means of committing the
crime [were] but alternative constituents of the same statutory offense; they [did] not constitute
separate and distinct offenses." Id. at 134, 470 P.2d at 200. Nevertheless, the court held that
the jury instructions
must clearly distinguish the alternative theories and require the necessity for a unani-
mous verdict on either of the alternatives. When such is the case, the prosecutor
need not be forced to elect, for fear that half of the jury will find the defendant guilty
on one theory and half on another theory.
Id. at 137, 470 P.2d at 201; cf infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (suggesting that it
would be appropriate to find murder committed with premeditation or in the course of a felony
viable alternatives for establishing first-degree murder, while nevertheless requiring jury una-
nimity to convict under one of the alternatives).
84. Boots, 308 Or. at 373-74, 780 P.2d at 726 (en banc).
85. Id. at 374, 780 P.2d at 727 (en banc).
86. Id. at 381, 780 P.2d at 731 (en banc).
87. Id. at 377-80, 780 P.2d at 729-30 (en bane).
88. Id. at 375, 780 P.2d at 728 (en banc).
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mous jury, as required by the state constitution. 9
Although prior to Schad the Supreme Court had not addressed the
problem raised by Boots and Sullivan-whether the availability of alter-
native means of establishing a crime requires the jury to agree specifically
on one of the alternatives-several of the federal courts of appeals had
done so.90 In United States v. Gipson9' the defendant was convicted
under a federal statute that prohibited the "receiving, concealing, storing,
bartering, selling, or disposing" of a stolen vehicle in interstate com-
merce.92 Finding that the prohibited actions fell into the two distinct
"conceptual groupings" of keeping the vehicle versus marketing it,93 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a jury
verdict which did not specify that the conviction was based on actions in
one group or the other was unconstitutional.94 In what became known
as the "Gipson test," the court held that
the two conceptual groupings are sufficiently different so that a
jury finding of the actus reus element of the offense would not
be 'unanimous' if some of the jurors thought the defendant
committed only an act in the first conceptual grouping while
others believed he committed an act only in the second.95
89. Id. at 377, 780 P.2d at 729 (en bane).
90. See, eg., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (The "trial court
erred in refusing to instruct that in order to return a unanimous verdict of guilty on a count
involving multiple distinct underlying acts, jurors are required to be unanimous as to the spe-
cific act by which the defendant violated the law."); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 462
(3d Cir. 1987) ("When the government chooses to prosecute under an indictment advancing
multiple theories, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the theories to the
satisfaction of the entire jury."); United States v. Jessee, 605 F.2d 430, 431 (9th Cir. 1979)
("[Defendant's] request for a special verdict was properly denied, since the trial court in-
structed that the jurors must unanimously agree on at least one of the factual allegations
charged.").
91. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 458.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 459. The court admitted that at a superficial level the mere finding of guilt by
each individual juror would constitute a "unanimous" verdict. Id. at 457. Nevertheless, the
court believed that such a result would belie the important policy considerations underlying
the unanimity requirement. Id. In particular, the general jury verdict would negate the essen-
tial jury function of "'reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts in issue."' Id.
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
95. Id. at 458. Because the Schad plurality believed that "conceptual groupings" could be
constructed at any of several levels of generality, it rejected this test as too indeterminate.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality opinion). But cf. Mark A. Gelowitz, Jury Unanimity on
Questions of Material Fact: When Six and Six Do Not Equal Twelve, 12 QUEEN's L.J. 66, 96
(1987) ("The Gipson approach ... is at least a reasoned, principled response... and is to be
preferred to a blind adherence to the intention of the legislature."); Note, Right to Jury Una-
nimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson, 91 HARV. L. Rrv. 499, 505 (1977)
("[Tihe Gipson rule is essential to insure that the prosecution has met its full burden of estab-
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Gipson thus established a test for measuring whether the alternative
means of committing a crime are so different that they must be treated as
separate offenses. The alternatives must be examined to determine
whether they are "conceptually distinct," which would require them to
be treated as separate offenses, or if distinguishing between them would
present "characterization problems" for the jury, which would allow
them to be treated as the same offense.96
The Supreme Court has never addressed directly the Gipson issue.
It has, however, addressed a number of "analogous" issues.97 In Ander-
sen v. United States,98 for example, the defendant was accused of murder
on the high seas.99 Because Andersen was alleged to have shot the ship's
mate and thrown his body overboard, 1" the indictment charged two
causes of death: shooting and drowning.101 The defendant objected to
the indictment on the grounds that it was duplicitous and uncertain,1" 2
but the Court rejected the argument because "the indictment charged the
transaction as continuous, and that two lethal means were employed co-
operatively by the accused to accomplish his murderous intent, and
whether the vital spark had fled before the riddled body struck the water,
or lingered till extinguished by the waves, was immaterial." 103 Because it
was undisputed that the defendant had caused the mate's death, the
Court's holding essentially turned on a question of timing; the Court was
unwilling to require the prosecution to specify the exact moment the vic-
lishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); Sally Wellman, Note, Jury Instructions and the
Unanimous Jury Verdict, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 339, 349 ("The Gipson rationale should be ap-
plied with respect to any statute which... defines different methods of committing the same
generic crime.").
96. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 458.
97. The plurality suggested that analogies to criminal indictments, to state efforts at bur-
den-shifting, and to statutes challenged on vagueness grounds would be helpful to an under-
standing of the issues raised in Schad. But see infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text
(arguing that the analogies are inappropriate).
98. 170 U.S. 481 (1898).
99. Id. at 483-84.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 492-93.
102. Id. at 500. Apparently, in the Schad plurality's view, this claim of uncertainty was
analogous to Schad's claim that Arizona was depriving him of a unanimous jury by charging
alternative ways of committing first-degree murder but allowing a general verdict. Schad, Ill
S. Ct. at 2496-97 (plurality opinion).
103. Andersen, 170 U.S. at 500. Implicit in this holding, however, must be the understand-
ing that the defendant caused the death, because causing a death is an essential element of
murder. Thus, Andersen permits a jury to find that the defendant either shot and killed the
victim or drowned the victim, where he clearly attempted to do both, so long as the jury finds
that the defendant in fact killed the victim. The either/or option does not extend to the ques-
tion of whether the defendant caused the death.
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tim died during a murderous assault."1 4
Lanzetta v. New Jersey105 called into question another analogous is-
sue of state criminal law: the level of specificity with which a state must
define criminal conduct.10 6 Under a New Jersey statute, any unemployed
person who belonged to a "gang" of two or more persons and who had
been convicted of being a disorderly person at least three times, or had
been convicted of any crime, was declared a "gangster."1 °7 This "crime'
carried with it a possible fine of $10,000, imprisonment for up to twenty
years, or both.01 The Court found the statute to be "repugnant to the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"10 9 because citizens
would be left to guess at the meaning of its vague terms.110 The statute
was not saved by the fact that the New Jersey courts had specifically
interpreted it, because the interpretation itself was framed to convict the
particular defendants then under indictment.1 1
While Lanzetta provided the Schad plurality with an example of the
104. Id. at 500-01. The Schad plurality contended that this unwillingness to require indict-
ment specificity also has manifested itself in the Court's considerations of verdict specificity, as
in McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990). Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality
opinion). Yet, McKoy concerned the question of whether juries must be unanimous in their
findings of mitigating circumstances (they need not be) rather than whether they must be
unanimous in their guilty verdicts. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1229. In fact, to support its position,
the plurality quoted from Justice Blackmun's concurrence in McKoy, but omitted a telling
footnote. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality opinion). That footnote stated:
[T]here is one significant exception to this principle [that juries need not agree on all
the preliminary factual issues underlying a verdict].... In federal criminal prosecu-
tions, where a unanimous virdict is required, the Courts of Appeals are in general
agreement that "[u]nanimity ... means more than a conclusory agreement that the
defendant has violated the statute in question; there is a requirement of substantial
agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a specified offense."
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1237 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Ferris, 719
F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983)).
105. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
106. Id. at 452-53. The Schad plurality pointed to Lanzetta as an example of the way in
which the Due Process Clause can constrain state efforts to define criminal conduct when
those efforts conflict with notions " 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.'" Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality opinion) (quoting Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). Ostensibly, this constraint also would apply to Ari-
zona's practice if it conflicted with such "fundamental" notions.
107. Lanzetta, 306 U. S. at 452. The Lanzetta Court focused its attention in particular on
the statute's use of the word "gang" and the absence of any settled definition of that term. Id.
at 453-57.
108. Id. at 452.
109. Id. at 458.
110. Id. at 453.
111. Id. at 457. "If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process
clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate
it." Id. at 453.
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constraints that due process imposes on state efforts to define criminal
conduct, Patterson v. New York I1 2 provided an example of judicial re-
straint in the face of state burden-shifting. 13 Patterson was convicted of
second-degree murder, defined in New York as causing the death of an-
other person with intent to kill.t New York also allowed for an affirm-
ative defense if the defendant acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, in which case the crime would be reduced to
manslaughter.1 5 Because the burden of proving extreme emotional dis-
turbance fell on the defendant, 11 6 Patterson argued that the statute vio-
lated due process." 7 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
declared the burden-shifting constitutionally valid because it neither
placed the burden of disproving any essential element of the crime on the
defendant, nor created any presumption of guilt that the defendant was
forced to rebut.' By contrast, two years earlier in Mullaney v. Wil-
bur,'1 9 the Court struck down a Maine statute which stated that if the
prosecution proved the defendant had committed an intentional and un-
112. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
113. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
114. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205.
115. Id. at 206.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Id. at 201.
118. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Patterson decision was hardly unanimous.
The Court split on the issue five-to-three (with one Justice not taking part in the decision), and
Justice Powell wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which he took issue with the majority for
allowing New York to shift to the defendant the burden of proving the key factor distinguish-
ing murder from manslaughter:
The test the Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually at will, the
burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is
careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in the statutory language that
defines the crime....
[T]his type of constitutional adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited
but significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law now becomes an excercise
in arid formalities. What Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits
a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the liberty of its citizens becomes
a rather simplistic lesson in statutory draftsmanship.
Id. at 223-24. (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Mark R. Adams, Note, Affirmative Criminal
Defenses--The Reasonable Doubt Rule in the Aftermath of Patterson v. New York, 39 OHIo
ST. L.J. 393, 400 (1978) ("The Patterson opinion leaves a void in which the exercise of state
autonomy in the area of criminal procedure is virtually unrestrained by constitutional limita-
tions."); Celia Goldwag, Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After Patterson v.
New York, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 656 (1978) (arguing that "the decision fails to provide a
rational basis for assessing the constitutionality of affirmative defenses"); Lee Ann Johnson,
Note, Recent Cases-Evidence-Patterson v. New York, 11 AKRON L. RaV. 386, 398 (1977)
(criticizing Patterson because it allows courts to avoid serious examination of defendants' sub-
stantive rights).
119. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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lawful homicide, malice aforethought was conclusively implied unless
disproved by the defendant.12 The Court found that Maine's practice
denigrated the defendant's due process protections because it further "in-
crease[d] ... the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction." '121
Mullaney and Patterson established who bore the burden of proof of
certain facts in a criminal prosecution; the Schad dissent argued that In
re Winship 122 established which facts had to be proven.123 In Winship a
juvenile was convicted in a New York family court of an act that, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted larceny.1 24 The convic-
tion was based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as allowed
by statute.1 25  The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional,126 and explicitly held for the first time that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."'1 27
The Schad dissent argued that Winship required Arizona to prove
premeditation or the commission of a felony beyond a reasonable doubt;
the plurality, on the other hand, declared that Winship was not on point
120. Id. at 703-04.
121. Id. at 701; see Stephen D. Brandt, Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mul-
laney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828, 835-36 (1975) (arguing that Mullaney correctly places
on the prosecution the burden of proving all "issues that bear upon the degree and type of
criminal culpability of the defendant," but admitting that the determination of which issues
are relevant is problematic). But cf. Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A
Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 30, 63 (1977) (contending that Patterson was correctly decided, while Mullaney was
incorrectly decided).
122. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
123. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359. The juvenile was placed in a training school for an 18-
month period, with the possibilty of extending the commitment for up to six years. Id. at 360.
The nature and extent of the punishment were central to the Court's decision. Id. at 363-66.
125. Id. at 360.
126. Id. at 364. The Court grounded its holding upon both the impact of the criminal
conviction on the accused and society's confidence in the criminal justice system:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense impor-
tance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.... More-
over, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical
that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
Id. at 363-64.
127. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). While Winship was concerned expressly with the consti-
tutionally necessary level of proof, the Schad dissent apparently understood Winship to mean
that each essential element ("every fact necessary to constitute the crime") must be proven
individually beyond a reasonable doubt. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509 (White, J. dissenting).
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since premeditation and the commission of a felony were not essential
elements of first-degree murder but instead were legally equivalent means
to a mens rea element. 128 As such, the plurality was concerned with
whether these legally equivalent means represented equivalently blame-
worthy mental states. To answer this question, the plurality looked to
Tison v. Arizona. 29 In Tison, the Supreme Court examined the culpabil-
ity associated with felony murder by considering whether the death pen-
alty is constitutionally permissible for defendants who are convicted of
felony murder but who did not commit the actual killing. 30 The Court
had ruled earlier, in Enmund v. Florida,13 ' that a convicted felony mur-
derer who did not actually kill but who intended to kill could be sen-
tenced to death. 132 The Court also had ruled that a felony murderer
whose participation in the crime was relatively minor and whose culpable
mental state was no greater than reckless indifference to human life could
not be sentenced to death. 133 Tison presented an intermediate prob-
lem.134 In Tison, the petitioners helped their father and another inmate
escape from prison, and heavily armed the two; during the escape, the
pair killed a family of four. 35 The petitioners themselves, however, did
not take part in the killing and did not intend that the family be killed;1 36
they played a major role in the underlying felony, but had mental states
of only reckless indifference to human life. 137 On these facts, the Court
found the death penalty to be constitutionally permissible. 138  In the
Court's opinion, the difference between the intent to kill and reckless
128. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2499-500 (plurality opinion).
129. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
130. Id.
131. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
132. Id. at 798-801.
133. Id.; see also John H. Wickert, Eighth Amendment-the Death Penalty and Vicarious
Felony Murder: Nontriggerman May Not Be Executed Absent a Finding of Intent to Kill, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1553, 1568 (1982) (finding Enmund to be correct but suggesting
that intent to kill, rather than actual commission of the killing, should be key factor determin-
ing death penalty imposition); Nancy A. McKerrow, Note, Mens Rea as an Element Necessary
for Capital Punishment, 48 Mo. L. RPv. 1063, 1071 (1983) (arguing that Enmund is important
because it stresses necessity of intent to kill for death penalty sentences).
134. Tison, 481 U.S. at 150.
135. Id. at 139.
136. Id. at 140.
137. Id. at 152.
138. Id. at 157-58. But see Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death
Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice Are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 123,
124 (1989) (arguing that the Court failed to apply the Eighth Amendment properly and de-
cided Tison incorrectly); Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Note, Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Ari-
zona Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. Rav. 817, 837
(1988) (questioning whether the rationale of Tison is consistent with Enmund and arguing that
Tison arbitrarily allows the death penalty to be imposed on nontriggermen).
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indifference to human life was not always a significant or telling one,
particularly where the underlying felony involved an inherently high risk
of death. 1
39
Against this backdrop of cases on equivalent culpability, on jury
unanimity, and on many analogous issues of a state's power to define
criminal conduct, the Schad plurality performed its due process analysis.
Ultimately, the analysis led to the central question, never before asked by
the Court, of "what constitutes an immaterial difference as to mere
means [of committing a single crime] and what constitutes a material
difference requiring separate theories of crime to be treated as separate
offenses subject to separate jury findings." 1" It is not clear, however,
that this is the question which the plurality requires be posed. Moreover,
even if it was the correct question, the plurality's answer provides little
self-justification and even less direction for the future.
Examining the Schad opinion requires at the outset an assessment of
whether the plurality asked the right question. Early in its opinion, the
plurality noted Schad's contention that Arizona's practice of not requir-
ing the jury to agree on either premeditated murder or felony murder
was unconstitutional. The plurality then recharacterized this claim:
Petitioner's first contention is that his conviction under in-
structions that did not require the jury to agree on one of the
alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder is
unconstitutional....
In other words, petitioner's real challenge is to Arizona's
characterization of first-degree murder as a single crime as to
which a verdict need not be limited to any one statutory alter-
native, as against which he argues that premeditated murder
and felony murder are separate crimes as to which the jury
must return separate verdicts. 141
In rephrasing the issue, the plurality allowed for a slight shift in termi-
nology that is of central importance. As the plurality accurately pointed
out, "the petitioner's real challenge is to Arizona's characterization of
first-degree murder as a single crime as to which a verdict need not be
139. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58. The Court reasoned that there were occasions when the
intent to kill would actually be less reprehensible than reckless indifference to human life. Id.
at 157. For example, those who intend to kill, but who do so in self-defense, are not criminally
liable. By contrast, a nonintentional killer who tortures his victim to death, or who shoots his
victim during the course of a robbery, utterly indifferent to the grave risks of the robbery itself,
"may be among the most dangerous and inhumane murderers of all." Id. Of course, this
rationale hardly justifies the Tison result, because neither of the defendants in Tison actually
killed the victims as the Court's hypothetical torturer and robber did. See infra note 176.
140. Schad, I1l S. Ct. at 2498 (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
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limited to any one statutory alternative."142 But from this challenge it
does not necessarily follow, as the plurality concluded, that the only al-
ternative is to find that "premeditated murder and felony murder are
separate crimes as to which the jury must return separate verdicts."' 143
While much of the subsequent analysis in Schad focused on whether pre-
meditated murder and felony murder were separate crimes, it is quite
clear that Schad's challenge to Arizona's practice would succeed if the
Court merely found that the verdict had to be limited to one statutory
alternative.'" Premeditated murder and felony murder could both be
characterized as first-degree murder, but the jury would have to convict
on one theory or the other. This would simply amount to an admission
that the alternative ways of establishing first-degree murder involve dif-
ferent essential elements.'4I Because of the alternatives the plurality pos-
ited, the issue shifted from one of jury unanimity-that is, defining a
unanimous jury-to one of the permissible limits of defining criminal
conduct.' 46 As such, a crucial problem was almost entirely ignored: Is a
jury unanimous when different jurors are convificed of the existence of
completely different, and perhaps even inconsistent, facts?
If the facts are inconsistent, the obvious answer seems to be "no,"
even in states that otherwise accept general verdicts based on alternative
theories.' 47 The more difficult problem arises when the jurors find the
existence of different but not inconsistent facts. Many states approve of
this type of general verdict on the theory that since the defendant is
charged with only one crime, the prosecution need prove only that the
statutorily defined crime was committed, not how it was committed:
"It is not necessary that a jury, in order to find a verdict, should
concur in a single view of the transaction disclosed by the evi-
142. Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
143. Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
144. Interestingly, the Court began by considering "what the jury must be unanimous
about":
Petitioner's jury was unanimous in deciding that the State had proved what, under
state law, it had to prove: that petitioner murdered either with premeditation or in
the course of committing a robbery. The question still remains whether it was consti-
tutionally acceptable to permit the jurors to reach one verdict based on any combina-
tion of the alternative findings.
Id. (plurality opinion). As previously noted, however, this is not the question that the Schad
plurality answered.
145. The dissent based its analysis upon this argument. See supra notes 61-62 and accom-
panying text.
146. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2496 (plurality opinion).
147. See, eg., Gavin v. State, 425 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he jury need
not be unanimous on a particular means of commission of the crime if ... those alternative
modes are not repugnant or inconsistent with each other.").
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dence. If the conclusion may be justified upon either of two
interpretations of the evidence, the verdict cannot be im-
peached by showing that a part of the jury proceeded upon one
interpretation and part upon the other."' 48
This approval frequently is grounded in the rationale employed by the
Schad plurality; namely, that one way of committing a crime is effec-
tively equivalent to another. 4 9 And, of course, the general verdict im-
proves the likelihood of conviction and facilitates judicial efficiency.' 5 '
But increased likelihood of conviction and greater judicial economy
are not the ends of the judicial system-justice is.' 5' And justice must be
grounded upon reliability, something that a general verdict, with its pos-
sibility of "patchwork" jury agreement, cannot guarantee:
A patchwork jury will, of course, always agree on the legal con-
clusion that the statute has been violated, and, if the patchwork
148. People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 671, 234 P.2d 632, 641 (1951) (quoting People v.
Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 127, 65 N.E. 989, 989 (1903)).
149. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503 (plurality opinion); see also State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341,
345, 552 P.2d 931, 935-36 (1976) (holding that underlying felony provides the mental state
necessary to establish first-degree murder).
150. See Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 144, 280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1979) ("To require
unanimity as to the manner of participation would be to frustrate the justice system, promote
endless jury deliberations, encourage hung juries, and precipitate retrials in an effort to find
agreement on a nonessential issue."), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980); Hayden J. Trubitt,
Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts
Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 473, 549-50 (1983).
151. In Holland the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed concerns that requiring unanim-
ity as to alternative theories regarding "the manner in which the defendant participated in the
crime" could "permit the guilty defendant to escape accountability under the law because
jurors could not unanimously choose beyond a reasonable doubt which of several alternative
ways the defendant actually participated, even though all agree he was, in fact, a participant."
Holland, 91 Wis. 2d at 143, 280 N.W.2d at 293. These concerns are grounded problematically
on the assumption that the defendant is guilty even though the jury has not been convinced
unanimously of any specific alternative theory of the crime. As the Oregon Supreme Court
cautioned,
[i]t seems questionable to characterize a person as "the guilty defendant" who will
"escape accountability" when the issue for the jury is whether every element of the
person's guilt has been proved. And "accountability under the law" is provided
when a person is prosecuted; if a jury does not convict, one would not refer to a
"guilty defendant" who "escapefs] accountability." Nor is the question whether a
jury could "choose" between different ways in which a defendant participated in the
crime. It is not a matter of "chooosing" but of factflnding. If more than one way is
charged and proved to the jury's unanimous satisfaction, the jury need not "choose"
and there is no difficulty. The problem arises precisely when none of the alternative
ways has been proved to the satisfaction of all jurors, when one or more jurors is in
doubt about each of the alternatives charged. We are not speaking here of factual
details, such as whether a gun was a revolver or a pistol and whether it was held in
the right or the left hand. We deal with facts that the law (or the indictment) has
made essential to a crime.
State v. Boots, 308 Or. 371, 379, 780 P.2d 725, 730 (1989) (en bane).
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verdict is arguably proper, one will always find that the jury has
also agreed on at least one concrete historical fact relating to
the crime. Thus the actus reus and corpus delicti requirements
will be formally satisfied. However, such minimal compliance
does not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. The jury is val-
ued not only as a community buffer between the accused citizen
and oppressive, overzealous law enforcers, but also as a guaran-
tor that the stigma of conviction will not be attached except on
clear proof of specific conduct.15 2
Moreover, the frequently reiterated assertion that a jury need only agree
on the ultimate fact of guilt rather than on specific ways of establishing
guilt is merely a circular form of answer to the question of what a jury
must agree upon in order to find the defendant guilty. To find a defend-
ant guilty, the reasoning seems to go, the jury must find him guilty. This
cannot be the basis for permitting the general verdict.
Nor can moral equivalence be the basis. While it might be true on
occasion that, for example, the premeditated murderer and the rapist
have committed equally heinous crimes, it would be absurd to conclude
that the rapist could therefore be convicted of murder. Something more
must be shown: namely, that the rapist also committed murder. Once
the murder has been proven, one could argue that the two crimes are the
same because they have the same actus reus (the unlawful killing of a
person) and the same mens rea (malice plus premeditation and malice
plus the commission of rape). But this scenario establishes only that
there are two ways of committing one crime, not that there are now two
ways of reaching one verdict. In fact, just the opposite conclusion should
be true. If a state is allowed to prosecute under the theory that premedi-
tated intent to kill and the commission of certain enumerated felonies are
always morally equivalent-clearly an overinclusive generalization-
then in order to prove first-degree murder on a felony murder theory a
state should be required to prove to the satisfaction of all twelve jurors
that the underlying felony was actually committed. If twelve jurors have
not been convinced that the felony was committed, or that premeditation
was present, then the defendant has not committed an act that can be
termed first-degree murder. The mere fact that all twelve jurors believe
152. Trubitt, supra note 150, at 530-31. Trubitt further suggested, however, that where a
"single offense" is involved, the patchwork verdict is permissible. Id. at 534. But it is not clear
that Arizona's definition of first-degree murder would comply with Trubitt's "single offense"
criteria, because premeditated intent to kill and the commission of a felony are conceptually
distinct; the defendant could presumably be subjected to double punishment because the felony
is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder in Arizona. See id. at 535. Where a statute is
ambiguous as to whether it actually defines a "single offense" or "separate offenses," the "sepa-
rate offenses" prohibition against patchwork verdicts should apply. Id. at 536.
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that first-degree murder has been committed is insufficient, because
"[t]he jury is in no position to detemine whether the liability imposed for
first degree murder attaches unless they first determine what the defend-
ant did."153
Assuming for the sake of argument that the plurality's framing of
the issue in Schad is accurate, it is questionable whether the ensuing
opinion offers carefully reasoned justification or clear-sighted guidance
for the future. As a rationale for the opinion, the plurality repeatedly
turned to "analogous" problems of the permissible limits in defining
criminal conduct embodied in the vagueness and burden-shifting
cases.154 The sufficiency of these analogies is at best problematic.
In Justice White's view, the vagueness cases are inappropriate analo-
gies to the situation in Schad because the Arizona statute under which
Schad was convicted was anything but vague: it established specific stat-
utory alternatives for proving criminal conduct but allowed the jury to
return a generalized verdict that failed to settle on any one of the alterna-
tives. 155 On another level, however, Justice Souter's argument that the
vagueness cases apply has merit. Just as, in the vagueness cases, the Con-
stitution places limits on a state's power to define a crime in nebulous or
incomprehensible terms, so too, in this jury unanimity case, the Constitu-
tion places limits on the state's power to define two different acts as the
same crime. But the parallel limitation only makes sense if one considers
it at this broad level of generality. For instance, Lanzetta v. New
Jersey,'56 the leading case that the plurality cited on the issue of vague-
ness, gives serious consideration to the interrelationship between state
legislative and state judicial action. According to Lanzetta, if a state
criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague, it cannot be rehabilitated by
the fact that the state court gives specific meaning to its terms when it is
153. Barbara L. Lauer, Comment, Jury Agreement and the General Verdict in Criminal
Cases, 19 LAND & WATER L. REv. 207, 214 (1984).
154. The plurality similarly drew an analogy to the fact that criminal indictments need not
specify which of the alleged acts the defendant actually committed. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2496
(plurality opinion); see supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. This analogy also was used
by the New York Court of Appeals to justify its decision in People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122,
128, 65 N.E. 989, 990 (1903), discussed supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. But the
criminal indictment differs substantially from the jury verdict. Flexibility at the indictment
stage makes intuitive sense-until the State has presented its case and elicited all the relevant
facts available, it cannot realistically be expected to settle on one interpretation of the evidence.
Factfinding is the jury's role. But once the State has presented all of its evidence and argued to
the jury that the evidence supports a criminal conviction (on one or possibly several theories),
the jury must decide which facts have been proved. Therefore, the general verdict does not
necessarily flow from, and perhaps even contradicts, the theory of indictment flexibility.
155. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2509 (White, J., dissenting).
156. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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applied to a particular defendant; rather, the specific meaning must be
"generally applicable."1"7 One could argue that the plurality opinion in
Schad condones precisely what Lanzetta prohibits. Under Lanzetta, if
the state legislature drafts a statute criminalizing conduct in terms so
vague that individuals of common intelligence would be unable to deter-
mine what conduct is prohibited, that statute is unconstitutional; under
Schad, if the state legislature criminalizes specifically enumerated actions
but the state's courts allow defendants to be convicted through genera-
lized verdicts that fail to specify the particular act found to have been
committed, the general verdict is permissible. Schad seems to validate
vagueness so long as it emanates from the judiciary rather than the legis-
lature. Thus, the plurality's vagueness analogy is highly questionable.
Likewise, the burden-shifting cases can be understood as analogous
to Schad only if one considers them at the level of generality specified by
the plurality." 8 Justice Souter said of these cases: "In each case, the
defendant argued that the excluded fact was inherently 'a fact necessary
to constitute the offense' that required proof beyond a reasonable doubt
under Winship, even though the fact was not formally an element of the
offense with which he was charged."1 9 Similarly, according to the plu-
rality, Schad was requesting that the prosecution be forced to prove a
fact--either premeditation or the underlying felony-which was not
properly an element of the crime. But in Mullaney the Supreme Court
held that a state statute could not shift the burden of proving an essential
element of a crime to the defendant."6 Thus, at least one of the burden-
157. Id. at 457.
158. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of burden-shifting
cases.
159. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501 (plurality opinion). Justice Souter implied that the defend-
ant was wrong in each of these cases, apparently to support the plurality's argument that
Schad was wrong in this case. This is not true. See, eg., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
697-99 (1975). In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986), the states' burden-shiftings were affirmed narrowly by five-to-four votes in the
Supreme Court. And as previously noted, the Patterson holding has received far from unani-
mous praise. See supra note 118. While the plurality was correct that the state has broad
discretion in burden-shifting, and therefore presumably also has broad discretion in defining
criminal conduct, that discretion is not unlimited. Thus, even if a fact is not formally an
element of an offense as defined by the state legislature, the definition may be unconstitutional.
For instance, a state legislature could not define murder in such a way that the death of a
person was not an element of the offense or that the burden was on the defendant to disprove
that a death had occurred. Thus, the mere fact that the state has excluded a particular fact
from the definition of a crime does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the state has no
burden of proving that fact.
160. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04; cf. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Limitations of Sub-
stantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L.
REV. 775, 776 (1975) (arguing that under Mullaney "the due process clause limits governmen-
tal power to define crime in whatever manner desired").
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shifting cases could be read as stating that statutory definitions of a crime
are not always dispositive. Instead, the court must search beneath the
black-letter meaning to discover the essential elements of the criminal
act, the elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Again,
the burden-shifting analogy fails to persuade.
Beyond the question of whether the cited precedent actually sup-
ports the plurality opinion lurks another significant problem: specifi-
cally, the notion that the commission of a felony and premeditation are
merely means of satisfying the mens rea element of first-degree murder,
rather than essential elements themselves. The plurality asserted that
"under Arizona law neither premeditation nor the commission of a fel-
ony is formally an independent element of first-degree murder; they are
treated as mere means of satisfying a mens rea element of high culpabil-
ity.' 16 1 But while the plurality repeatedly suggested ways in which the
mens rea element may be satisfied, it neglected to discuss the mens rea
requirement itself. Under the plurality's reading, the Arizona first-de-
gree niurder statute paradoxically contains no mens rea element, only the
means to satisfy it.162
Mens rea is the mental element of a crime.' 63 It is possible, there-
161. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2501 (plurality opinion).
162. The distinction between the means to the mens rea and the mens rea itself is not
merely a semantic one, for the plurality based its analysis on the presumption that the jury
must agree on the essential elements of a crime but not on the means of establishing those
elements. Id. at 2496-97 (plurality opinion). The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the
plurality
misse[d] the mark in attempting to compare this case to those in which the issue
concerned proof of facts regarding the particular means by which a crime was com-
mitted. In the case of burglary, for example, the manner of entering is not an ele-
ment of the crime; thus, Winship would not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of such factual details as whether a defendant pried open a window with a screw-
driver or a crowbar. It would, however, require the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant in fact broke and entered, because those are the "fact[s]
necessary to constitute the crime."
Id. at 2510 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). One
commentator considerd it a "startlingly clear proposition" that a jury must agree on one alter-
native in order to be unanimous. Lauer, supra note 153, at 207. Lauer also suggested that
using terms such as "means" provides courts with a way to rationalize nonunanimous verdicts:
Some statutes provide that a single offense may be committed in more than one
way. In such cases, the courts tend to decide that jury agreement is not necessary.
The courts which have adopted this view have variously described the alternatives
such statutes present as "ways," "methods," "means," "elements," "modes," "theo-
ries of the participation," o[r] "views of the transaction." The terminology is unim-
portant. The judgment the terminology expresses is important, for it removes these
alternatives from the realm of necessary jury agreement.
Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
163. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Sco-rr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27,
at 192 (1972).
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fore, to conceive of the commission of a felony as a means of satisfying
the mens rea element, because the underlying felony can only be proved
if its requisite mens rea is proved. It is not the least bit clear, however,
that premeditation provides a means to that end.
"'Premeditation' is the process simply of thinking about a proposed
killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct." 1  It is the mental
component, or mens rea, of the crime. Hence, premeditation must be
proven as an essential element, not as a means to satisfying an essential
element, in order to prove first-degree murder. 6 The plurality repeat-
edly stated that neither premeditation nor the underlying felony was an
independent element of the charged crime; but the plurality surely must
accept the notion that in order to convict for premeditated murder, pre-
meditation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and in order to
convict for felony murder, the underlying felony-made up of its constit-
uent mens rea and actus reus elements-must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. 66 If premeditation and the underlying felony are not
essential elements, it is hard to conceive what role they could possibly
play in the statutory scheme. 67
164. CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 140, at 181 (14th ed. 1979)
(emphasis added); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 2, § 2, at 92 (2d ed.
1969) (" 'Premeditation means "thought of beforehand" for some length of time.' ") (quoting
State v. Chavis, 231 N.C. 307, 311, 56 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1949)) (emphasis added).
165. Similarly, the felonies listed in Arizona's first-degree murder statute are elements of
the crime of first-degree murder, not means of satisfying the mens rea element. It would obvi-
ously be preposterous to assume that the state could prove first-degree murder by proving to
three jurors that the defendant committed rape and murder, to three others that he committed
robbery and murder, to three others that he committed arson and murder, and to the final
three that he committed kidnapping and murder. But this is precisely the conclusion com-
pelled by the plurality's analysis. If each of the felonies merely provides the means to satisfy
the mens rea element, then the patchwork verdict just suggested is valid.
166. See, eg., State v. Boots, 308 Or. 371, 780 P.2d 725 (1989) (en banc). In Boots the
Oregon Supreme Court observed that
[t]here is no basis for distinguishing between jury agreement on the act required for
criminal liability and on the mental element that makes the act culpable. The act and
the culpable mental state are equally essential for any crime that requires a culpable
mental state. Of course jurors cannot convict a defendant if they unanimously agree
that he intended to kill a person but only half believe he did so. No more can they
convict if they unanimously agree that a defendant's act caused a person's death but
only half believe that he acted intentionally. The same is true if jurors agree that a
defendant's act caused a person's death but do not agree that the defendant commit-
ted a felony, or vice versa.
Id. at 376-77, 780 P.2d at 728 (en banc) (citations omitted).
167. The possibility that premeditation and the commission of a felony might simply estab-
lish equivalently culpable mental states does not solve the problem. It could be argued that if
the two mental states are equivalently culpable, and if the purpose of a mens rea requirement
for a crime is merely to establish a culpability level necessary to constitute the crime, then it
would seem permissible to convict a defendant of first-degree murder so long as all twelve
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Even if premeditation and the commission of a felony are simply
ways of satisfying the mens rea element of murder, the plurality's "fun-
damental fairness" '168 analysis provides little direction in determining
jurors agree that his mental state was sufficiently culpable, regardless of why they believe this.
But why they believe the defendant to be culpable is of the utmost significance. The finding of
premeditation in no way negates the possibility that the underlying felony also was committed.
Thus, the verdict would stand if all twelve jurors could agree that the defendant acted with
premeditation, and six of them additionally believe that he committed the underlying felony.
The dilemma arises when some of the jurors believe the defendant acted with premeditation
but did not commit the underlying felony, and the rest believe that he committed the underly-
ing felony but did not otherwise act with premeditation. Suppose, for example, that eleven
jurors believe the defendant acted with premeditation but only one believes he committed the
felony. To allow this divided jury to return a "unanimous" first-degree murder conviction
would be to permit an untenable paradox. The defendant would be guilty of first-degree mur-
der because of the felony murder rule (otherwise there would be a hung jury), and yet he would
not be guilty of the felony itself (the jury could not reach unanimous agreement on it). What
this means is that the legal conclusion of one juror-unsustained by jury consensus or sup-
port-that the defendant committed a felony, would establish the defendant's guilt.
168. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500 (plurality opinion). The plurality derived its understanding
of fundamental fairness and the way in which the requirement of fundamental fairness both
colors the Court's "concrete judgments about the adequacy of legislative determinations," id.
(plurality opinion), and compels its judicial restraint, from Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342, 352-53 (1990). Schad, Ill S. Ct. at 2500 (plurality opinion). In Dowling, the Court
upheld the admission of testimony in a bank robbery trial about the defendant's presence in the
house of a burglary victim, despite the fact that the defendant had been acquitted of burglariz-
ing the house in a previous trial. The prior acquittal had exonerated the defendant of burglary,
the Court reasoned, but not of being present in the house, and therefore the admission of this
testimony was not a violation of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause. Id. (plurality opinion). The Dowling Court derived its notion of fundamental fairness
from United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that a
17-month.delay between the initial investigation of a crime and the indictment of the defendant
did not violate the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, even though the defendant
contended that material defense testimony had been lost during the delay. Id. at 796. The
Lovasco Court interpreted fundamental fairness to mean that the Court could not substitute its
notions of fairness for those of the state's law enforcement officials. This definition of fairness
came from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the Court overturned the
defendant's conviction for narcotics possession because the narcotics were secured from the
defendant by forcibly pumping his stomach. Id. at 166. While Rochin ackowledged the im-
portance of judicial restraint, it did not command absolute deference in the face of legislative
decisionmaking.
To practice the requisite detachment [required of judges] and to achieve sufficient
objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism,
incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views
not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They
are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with
ultimate judicial power.... The faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite
and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due
process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the
spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the de-
tached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but
duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progres-
sive society.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
whether those ways are materially different from each other and there-
fore constitutionally prohibited from being equated. Apparently, the
plurality contemplated the fundamental fairness analysis as based upon a
two-pronged inquiry:
[W]e look both to history and wide practice as guides to funda-
mental values, as well as to narrower analytical methods of test-
ing the moral and practical equivalence of the different mental
states that may satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense.
The enquiry is undertaken with a threshold presumption of leg-
islative competence to determine the appropriate relationship
between means and ends in defining the elements of a crime. 1 69
In other words, the first prong requires a court to ask whether history
and current state practice treat the two means under consideration in the
same manner that Arizona does. Under the second prong a court must
determine whether the two means are morally and practically equivalent.
If Arizona's practice passes both of these tests it will survive constitu-
tional scrutiny because it will "not fall beyond the constitutional bounds
of fundamental fairness and rationality."' 170
Under the first prong, the plurality found that defining first-degree
murder as a crime that can be committed with premeditation or in the
course of committing a felony was a practice that had received "histori-
cal and contemporary acceptance."' 171 Thus, while the plurality claimed
Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted). The Schad plurality's reliance on historical precedent and
deference for legislative decisionmaking, see infra notes 169-72, 174-77 and accompanying
texts, seems a far cry from Rochin's mandate that judges be "duly mindful of... change[s] in a
progressive society.' Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
169. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2500 (plurality opinion).
170. Id. at 2504 (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 2502 (plurality opinion). "[There is sufficiently widespread acceptance [of the
practice] ... to persuade us that Arizona has not departed from the norm." Id. (plurality
opinion). Despite this broad acceptance by the states, the felony murder doctrine has been
widely criticized by commentators as
essential[ly] illogic[al].... Punishment for homicide obtains only when the deed is
done with a state of mind that makes it reprehensible as well as unfortunate. Murder
is invariably punished as a heinous offense and is the principal crime for which the
death penalty is authorized. Sanctions of such gravity demand justification, and their
imposition must be premised on the confluence of conduct and culpability. Thus,....
murder occurs if a person kills purposely, knowingly, or with extreme recklessness.
Lesser culpability yields lesser liability, and a person who inadvertently kills another
under circumstances not amounting to negligence is guilty of no crime at all. The
felony-murder rule contradicts this scheme. It bases conviction of murder not on any
proven culpability with respect to homicide but on liability for another crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt., at 36 (1980); cf LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 163, § 71,
at 560 ("[Uit is arguable that there should be no such separate category [as felony murder].");
PERKINS, supra note 164, ch. 2, § 1, at 44 ("At the present time ... the reason for the rule has
ceased to exist.").
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that neither historical nor current acceptance was "dispositive,"172 the
first prong would seem to be satisfied whenever a practice is or has been
in common use.
For example, after returning again to the burden-shifting analogy,
the plurality noted that where a state has placed the burden of proof of a
particular issue on the defendant, and burden-shifting "has a long his-
tory, or is in widespread use" in that state, the defendant will be hard
pressed to overcome the presumption of fundamental fairness. 173 Con-
versely, if burden-shifting is highly unusual in terms of history or current
practice, the defendant's task will be significantly lighter. In either case,
however, the plurality provided no indication of how the defendant
might demonstrate a lack of fundamental fairness other than through the
history/current-practice analysis.
The second prong of the analysis-whether the means are morally
and practically equivalent-is equally unenlightening.174 "The question
... [was] whether felony murder may ever be treated as the equivalent of
murder by deliberation, and in particular whether robbery murder as
172. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2502 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 2501 (plurality opinion).
174. The analysis of whether the Due Process Clause, as understood through Beck v. Ala-
bama, requires an instruction on every lesser-included offense of a capital offense is similarly
perfunctory. In the plurality's view, the Beck standard is a mechanical one:
Our fundamental concern in Beck was that a jury convinced that the defendant had
committed some violent crime but not convinced that he was guilty of a capital crime
might nonetheless vote for a capital conviction if the only alternative was to set the
defendant free with no punishment at all.... We repeatedly stressed the all-or-
nothing nature of the decision with which the jury was presented.... This central
concern of Beck simply is not implicated in the present case.
Id. at 2504-05 (plurality opinion). According to the plurality, the Beck concern was not impli-
cated in this case because the jury was instructed on a third option-second-degree murder-
thereby eliminating the all-or-nothing approach. Id. at 2505 (plurality opinion). But Beck is
not quite so simple as the plurality suggested because in Beck there also was a third option:
the jury was instructed that if it could not agree on a verdict, a mistrial would be declared.
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 643-44 (1980). The Beck Court rejected this as a viable third
option: "We are not persuaded by the State's argument that the mistrial 'option' is an ade-
quate substitute for proper instructions on lesser-included offenses." Id. at 644. In other
words, Beck not only requires that there be a third option when a lesser-included offense is
implicated, but also that the third option be a rational one. The plurality in Schad simply
swept this concern away by stating that it would be irrational to assume that a jury which was
convinced the defendant had only committed robbery would nevertheless convict of first-de-
gree murder rather than second-degree murder. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505 (plurality opinion).
But there are at least two problems with this response. First, merely because the jury in
this hypothetical convicted the defendant of first- rather than second-degree murder (appar-
ently rejecting the notion that the defendant had only committed robbery) does not mean that
the instruction was constitutionally proper. Indeed, the jury's vote means that the instructions
are questionable only if the jury brought in a second-degree murder verdict, because only in
that situation would it be apparent that the jury might have chosen the robbery option, had it
been included. One can easily foresee, however, the Court declaring that it would be irrational
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charged in this case may be treated as thus equivalent."' 75 The plurality
answered "yes," because in Tison v. Arizona the Court had already found
that there are times when a felony murderer who did not specifically
intend to kill can be sentenced to death. 176  Like the history/current-
practice inquiry, this analyis is historically based: if the Court can find
other cases in which the two acts in question were considered equally
reprehensible, then they must be morally equivalent.177 The plurality's
for the jury to convict on second-degree murder when the jurors believed the defendant was
guilty only of robbery, because the two crimes have no elements in common.
Second, the plurality took for granted that a jury instructed on the elements of premedi-
tated murder, robbery-murder, second-degree murder, and on the possibility of acquittal, yet
believing that the defendant had only committed robbery, would either convict on second-
degree murder or acquit. But because robbery-murder is the only crime bearing any resem-
blance to robbery, it is not absolutely clear that a jury would do this. The plurality should
have looked more closely at the "logic" that might play a role in the jury's decisionmaking
process.
Moreover, the fact that the plurality upheld Arizona's practice of requiring only a general
guilty verdict when both premeditated and felony murder are charged compounds the problem
of not requiring instructions on a lesser-included offense. Beck appears to require that if Ari-
zona prosecutes a defendant only on a felony murder theory, Arizona courts must instruct on
a lesser-included offense. Arizona law, however, specifically forbids this instruction by holding
that there are no lesser-included offenses of felony murder. Because Schad declared that the
jury need not agree on either premeditated murder or felony murder, the State will always
prosecute on both theories and charge second-degree murder as the "third option" required by
Beck. Furthermore, the charge of premeditated murder will always seem legitimate because
the Schad plurality declared premeditation and the commission of a felony to be morally
equivalent means to an end, rather than distinct elements of the crime of first-degree murder.
175. Schad, IIl S. Ct. at 2503 (plurality opinion).
176. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). The plurality in Schad pointed out that in
Tison the Court had declared that "'the reckless disregard for human life implicit in know-
ingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents.., a
highly culpable mental state.'" Schad, I ll S. Ct. at 2503 (plurality opinion) (quoting Tison,
481 U.S. at 157). Moreover, the plurality "accepted the proposition that this disregard occurs,
for example, when a robber 'shoots someone in the course of a robbery, utterly indifferent to
the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as
well as taking the victim's property.'" Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 157).
Unfortunately, this analysis assumes that a reckless disregard for human life is implicit in
certain criminal activities rather than assuming that the disregard must be proven in order to
establish a highly culpable mental state, and also implies that any individual convicted of fel-
ony murder actually caused the victim's death himself. This implication is unjustified because
a felony-murder defendant can be convicted for a killing that actually was caused by a cofelon.
In fact, Schad's defense at trial was that he robbed the victim but did not kill him. Id. at 2505
(plurality opinion). If this were true and a cofelon actually had killed the victim (something
Schad did not claim), Schad could still be convicted under Arizona's first-degree murder stat-
ute. It is not clear, however, that he would be as culpable as a "robber [who] 'shoots someone
in the course of a robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the
unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property.'" Id.
(plurality opinion) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 157).
177. But as Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence,
the petitioner here does not complain about lack of moral equivalence: he complains
that, as far as we know, only six jurors believed he was participating in a robbery, and
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fundamental fairness test might occasionally invalidate a new state crimi-
nal procedure, but it is hard to imagine how the plurality could ever
really test the intrinsic fairness of a well-entrenched historical practice.
At first glance, the Schad decision appears not to work a great
change in the law of criminal procedure. After all, the practice of per-
mitting general verdicts in combined felony murder/premeditated mur-
der prosecutions is widespread. But the Schad plurality squandered an
opportunity to set forth the meaning of jury unanimity in a cogent man-
ner, and by so doing, effectively declared that verdict specificity is never
essential. Unfortunately, the plurality went even further by grounding
the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness so deeply in historical
practice that "fairness" cannot be understood realistically to have either
an intrinsic or an evolving meaning. Without admitting it, the plurality
essentially adopted Justice Scalia's view that "[ilt is precisely the histori-
cal practices that define what is 'due.' "78 In light of Schad, the future
of due process, like that of verdict specificity, looks remarkably like the
past.
JAMES J. McGuIRE
only six believed he intended to kill. Perhaps moral equivalence is a necessary condi-
tion for allowing such a verdict to stand, but surely the plurality does not pretend
that it is sufficient. (We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that
the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday, despite the "moral
equivalence" of those two acts.) Thus, the plurality approves the Arizona practice in
the present case because it meets one of the conditions for constitutional validity. It
does not say what the other conditions are, or why the Arizona practice meets them.
Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
178. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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